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A Rejection of State Efforts to Enforce Gaming Laws
on
Indian Lands in the Absence of a Tribal-State Compact
Mark H. Reeves*
Ever since the Seminole Tribe of Florida opened the United States’
first Indian bingo hall on its reservation lands near Hollywood, Florida on
December 14, 1979,1 state and municipal governments have attempted to
assert jurisdiction over and enforce their own laws against gaming activity
in Indian country. Such efforts, along with the resulting litigation and
judicial decisions, quickly drew the attention of Congress. In 1988, after
concluding that “existing federal law does not provide clear standards or
regulations for the conduct of gaming on Indian lands,”2 Congress enacted
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) to “provide a statutory basis for
the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe.”3
IGRA was intended, inter alia, to establish the primacy of tribal
control and federal oversight of on-reservation gaming.4 At the same time,
it was designed to provide an opportunity for states to play a limited role in
the regulation of certain types of gaming and enforcement of the Act by
successfully negotiating compacts with gaming tribes.5 In many instances,
IGRA’s regulatory framework and compacting process have worked well, if
not seamlessly. Not all states, however, have proven willing to accept their
necessarily and statutorily limited role in Indian country gaming. This
includes states within the Eleventh Circuit, which are of particular interest
to this symposium. The State of Florida agreed to a compact with the
Seminole Tribe only after protracted litigation,6 and no compact is in place
between the state and the Miccosukee Tribe. The State of Alabama has
refused to enter into a compact with the Poarch Band of Creek Indians,
choosing instead to file suit in an effort to apply state laws to gaming

* Associate, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP; J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School,
2004; B.A., University of Georgia, 2001.
1 History—Seminoles
Today,
SEMINOLE
TRIBE
FLA.,
http://www.semtribe.com/History/SeminolesToday.aspx (last visited Nov. 24, 2013) (“The opening of
the Tribe’s first high-stake bingo hall in Hollywood . . . was a national first.”).
2 25 U.S.C. § 2701(3) (2014).
3 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (2014).
4 See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2014).
5 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2014).
6 See Part II. A, infra.

REEVES_PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE)

332

10/18/2014 1:49 PM

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 9:331

activity on the Tribe’s trust lands without agreeing to a compact.7
This article examines the role that Congress envisioned and intended
for states in the regulation of gaming activity in Indian country and the
enforcement of gaming laws under IGRA. Part I provides a brief overview
of the development of Indian gaming prior to IGRA and of IGRA itself.
Part II discusses the post-IGRA experiences of the Seminole Tribe of
Florida and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, two federally-recognized
Indian tribes based within the Eleventh Circuit, and some of the efforts by
the states of Florida and Alabama to regulate or limit Indian country
gaming activity post-IGRA. Part III analyzes IGRA’s text, legislative
history, and rationale to support the argument that Congress did not intend
for IGRA to give states any role in enforcing gaming laws or regulating
gaming activity on Indian lands beyond that expressly agreed to by tribes in
the context of tribal-state compacts.
I.

A.

INDIAN COUNTRY GAMING AND RESULTING LITIGATION LEADS TO
THE PASSAGE OF IGRA
Pre-IGRA Indian Gaming and Resulting Litigation
1.

Litigation Over the Seminole Tribe’s Florida Gaming Facility
Sets the Stage.

Indian gaming, at least in the context that it generally is thought of
today, began on December 14, 1979, when the Seminole Tribe opened a
bingo hall on reservation lands near Hollywood, Florida, just south of Fort
Lauderdale.8 Operating in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions
rejecting state taxing and civil regulatory authority over the on-reservation
activities of Indians and Indian tribes,9 the Seminole Tribe openly
disregarded Florida’s statutory restrictions on the operation of bingo halls.10
When the Broward County sheriff threatened to make arrests for these
violations of Florida’s bingo statute, the Seminole Tribe filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking to
permanently enjoin the enforcement of Florida’s bingo laws on the Tribe’s

7 See generally Complaint, Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., No. 29-CV-900057.00 (Cir. Ct.
Elmore Cnty., Ala., Feb. 19, 2013).
8 See, e.g., History—Seminoles Today, supra note 1.
9 See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1976); McClanahan v. State Tax
Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49
(1973).
10 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 491 F. Supp. 1015, 1016-17 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff’d,
658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981).
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reservation lands.11 After satisfying itself as to the existence of jurisdiction,
the District Court held that Florida’s bingo statute imposed a civil
regulatory scheme that was unenforceable on Indian lands under the rule set
forth by the Supreme Court in Bryan v. Itasca County.12 Accordingly, it
granted the Tribe’s motion for summary judgment and enjoined the
sheriff’s office from enforcing the state’s bingo statute on Seminole
reservation lands.13 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, declaring that “states
lack jurisdiction over Indian reservation activity until granted that authority
by the federal government” and that the state had failed to identify any such
grant of authority vis-à-vis the Seminole Tribe’s on-reservation gaming
activity.14
2.

Indian Gaming Litigation Reaches the Supreme Court.

The Seminole Tribe’s case was not the only Indian gaming litigation
winding its way through the federal court system in the early 1980s.
Several other tribes opened gaming facilities shortly after the Seminole
Tribe’s Hollywood-area bingo hall went into operation.15 Opening such
facilities frequently led to litigation between tribes and state or local
authorities.16 The most significant piece of this litigation in terms of legal
precedent involved the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians in

11

Id.
Id. at 1020.
13 Id.
14 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 312 (5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981). The
focal point of the first round of litigation over the Seminole Tribe’s gaming operations was whether
Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 588, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, constituted a
congressional grant of authority for Florida to regulate the Tribe’s on-reservation gaming. See Seminole
Tribe, 658 F.2d at 312-13; Seminole Tribe, 491 F. Supp. at 1020. Public Law 280 is a federal statute
allowing certain states, including Florida, to exercise criminal jurisdiction and very limited civil
jurisdiction over conduct on Indian reservations. Seminole Tribe, 658 F.2d at 312-13. The Supreme
Court held in Bryan that Public Law 280 does not “confer general state civil regulatory control over
Indian reservations,” so the question left for the district court and the Eleventh Circuit in the early
Seminole cases was whether the Florida bingo statute was a civil regulatory law or a criminal one. See
Bryan, 426 U.S. at 384; Seminole Tribe, 658 F.2d at 313. Both courts agreed that Florida’s law was a
civil regulatory one, and thus it was inapplicable on the Seminole Tribe’s reservation lands. See
Seminole Tribe, 658 F.2d at 314-15.
15 See, e.g., Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Cnty. of Riverside, 783 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that California’s bingo statute was a civil regulatory law that did not apply to on-reservation
tribal gaming), aff’d, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); Barona Grp. of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v.
Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that California state and local laws governing bingo were
civil regulatory statutes that were inapplicable to on-reservation gaming); Oneida Tribe of Indians of
Wis. v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (holding that Wisconsin’s bingo laws could not
be enforced on the Oneida Tribe’s reservation).
16 See Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1976); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of
Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973); see
also Section I. A (1) infra.
12
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California. Like the Seminole Tribe, both the Cabazon and Morongo Bands
(“the Bands”) opened gaming facilities on their reservation lands and
operated them in a manner that was non-compliant with state and local laws
regulating gambling.17 Facing the threat of legal action, the Bands filed suit
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Riverside County from
enforcing a local ordinance ostensibly prohibiting the Bands’ gaming
activities.18 The State of California intervened, arguing that the Bands’
gaming also violated state laws regulating bingo games, and the parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment.19 Both the District Court and
the Ninth Circuit sided with the Bands, issuing and affirming a permanent
injunction against the enforcement of state and local gaming laws on the
Bands’ reservations.20
Through the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Cabazon litigation closely
resembled the Seminole Tribe’s case and other, contemporary litigation
over state and local governmental efforts to regulate on-reservation gaming
activity.21 It became a landmark case, however, when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to definitively address the rising tide of tribal gaming
litigation.22 Like the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court started from
the foundational principles that “Indian tribes retain attributes of
sovereignty over both their members and their territory . . . that tribal
sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the federal
government, not the States . . . [and] that state laws may be applied to tribal
Indians on their reservations [only] if Congress has expressly so
provided.”23 The Court rejected arguments by both the state and county that
Congress had authorized state and local regulation of on-reservation tribal
gaming either through Public Law 28024 or the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970.25 It also rejected the argument that the state’s interest in
regulation of tribal bingo games—ostensibly to prevent the infiltration of
organized crime—outweighed the compelling federal and tribal interests in
17

See Cabazon Band, 783 F.2d at 901.
Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 906.
21 See Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1976); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of
Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973); see
also Section I. A (1) infra.
22 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987).
23 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
24 See Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1976); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of
Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973); see
also Section I. A (1) infra.
25 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 937 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955). See Cabazon
Band, 480 U.S. at 207.
18
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tribal self-determination and economic development, such that it justified
state regulation of the Bands’ on-reservation gaming.26 In the Court’s view,
the application of settled principles of federal Indian law inescapably led to
the conclusion that state regulation of on-reservation gaming “would
impermissibly infringe on tribal government . . . .”27
B.

IGRA—The Congressional Response to Cabazon

The Supreme Court’s decision in Cabazon definitively established that
on-reservation tribal gaming was a lawful and legitimate exercise of tribal
sovereignty that escaped the reach of state and local regulatory laws, unless
and until Congress expressly provided to the contrary. Congress already had
considered comprehensive Indian gaming regulation well in advance of the
Cabazon decision;28 the Supreme Court’s holding raised the profile of
Indian gaming even higher. It was thus unsurprising when IGRA became
law less than two years after the Supreme Court handed down Cabazon.29
The opening section of IGRA set forth a number of important
congressional findings underlying the Act. Congress found that federal
law, as it existed post-Cabazon, did “not provide clear standards or
regulations for the conduct of gaming on Indian lands.”30 It also affirmed
that “a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic
development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”31
Finally, Congress reaffirmed that “Indian tribes have the exclusive right to
regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming is not specifically
prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not,
as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming
activity.”32
Based on these findings, Congress codified several purposes for IGRA.
One was to “provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian
tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, selfsufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”33 Another was “to declare that
the establishment of independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming
on Indian lands [and] the establishment of Federal standards for gaming on
26

Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. at 215-22.
Id. at 222.
28 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 99-1920 (1985); H.R. REP. NO. 99-3130 (1985); Alex Tallchief
Skibine, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act at 25: Successes, Shortcomings, and Dilemmas, 60-APR
FED. LAW. 35, 36 (2013).
29 The Supreme Court handed down Cabazon on February 25, 1987; IGRA, Pub. L. 100-497, 102
Stat. 2467 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq.), was enacted on October 17, 1988.
30 25 U.S.C. § 2701(3) (2014).
31 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (2014).
32 25 U.S.C.A. § 2701(5) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
33 25 U.S.C.A. § 2702(1) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
27
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Indian lands . . . are necessary to meet congressional concerns regarding
gaming and to protect such gaming as a means of generating tribal
revenue.”34 Congress also declared the need and its intent to create a
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) to fulfill the federal
government’s role in overseeing gaming in Indian country and
implementing IGRA.35
IGRA divides gaming on “Indian lands” into three classes, each of
which is subject to a different level of extra-tribal oversight or regulation.36
Class I gaming, which consists of “social games solely for prizes of
minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by
individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or
celebrations,”37 is left to the exclusive jurisdiction of tribes and is not even
subject to IGRA.38 Class II gaming, which IGRA defines as “the game of
chance commonly known as bingo (whether or not electronic, computer, or
other technologic aids are used in connection therewith),” as well as certain
card games when played in conformity with state laws allowing those card
games, remains under tribal jurisdiction, but is subject to IGRA.39 IGRA
provisions applicable to Class II gaming provide for NIGC monitoring of
gaming, mandate NIGC-approved tribal gaming ordinances, and restrict the
use of net gaming revenues, among other things.40 Class III gaming, a
catch-all category is defined by IGRA as “all forms of gaming that are not
Class I gaming or Class II gaming,” is subject to the most extensive
regulation, including a limited level of state oversight.41 IGRA limits
lawful Class III gaming to Indian country lands that are “located in a State
that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or
entity,” and even then, such gaming must be “conducted in conformance
with a tribal-state compact entered into by the Indian Tribe and the State.”42

34

25 U.S.C.A. § 2702(3) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
25 U.S.C.A. § 2702(3) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
36 IGRA defines “Indian lands” as “all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and . . .
any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or
individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against
alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (West
through 2014 legislation). The term “Indian country,” as used throughout this article, should be
understood to have the same definition.
37 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(6) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
38 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(a)(1) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
39 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(7)(A) (West, Westlaw though 2014 legislation). IGRA expressly excludes
certain games, including “any banking card games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, or blackjack (21)”
as well as “slot machines of any kind,” from its definition of Class II gaming. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(7)(B)
(West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
40 See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2706(b), 2710(a)(2)-(b) (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation).
41 25 U.S.C.A. § 2703(8) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
42
25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2710(d)(1)(B)-(C) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation). IGRA also
35
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By requiring tribes to successfully negotiate tribal-state compacts in
order to conduct lawful Class III gaming, IGRA provides a limited
opportunity for states to participate in the regulation of gaming activity on
Indian lands. For example, the Act expressly provides that tribal-state
compacts may include provisions relating to, inter alia, the application of
state civil and criminal gaming laws on tribal lands and the allocation of
state and tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction necessary to enforce those
laws.43 Importantly, however, IGRA seeks to preserve a balance of power
between tribes and states. It imposes an obligation for states to negotiate in
good faith when a tribe requests a compact, and it provides federal court
jurisdiction over state actions to enjoin Class III tribal gaming on Indian
lands only when such gaming is “conducted in violation of any tribal-state
compact . . . that is in effect.”44
Outside of enforcing mutually agreed-upon tribal-state compacts,
IGRA does not articulate any role for states in Indian country gaming.
Gaming tribes retain much authority,45 and the remainder is vested in the
federal government of the United States. Specifically, IGRA grants the
NIGC a significant regulatory and enforcement role that includes the ability
to level a wide panoply of civil fines and other penalties,46 and it also
includes a separately codified penal provision that incorporates state
gambling laws “for purposes of federal law” and grants the United States
Attorney General exclusive authority over the prosecution of criminal
violations of IGRA.47
While IGRA’s delegation and division of authority between tribes,
states, and the federal government may seem straightforward, it has not
proven so in practice. As discussed below, some states have fiercely
resisted IGRA’s limitations on their role in Indian country gaming, and they
have done so with varying degrees of success and legitimacy.
II.

STATES ATTEMPT TO REGULATE INDIAN GAMING WITHOUT
COMPACTS AFTER IGRA

The passage of IGRA did not end disputes between tribes and states
over gaming in Indian country. It merely marked a new chapter with a new

imposes other prerequisites on tribes that would conduct Class III gaming, including, inter alia, the
adoption of a tribal gaming ordinance or resolution that must be approved by the NIGC and the approval
of any tribal-state compact by the Secretary of the Interior. See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2710(d)(2)(A), (d)(3)(B)
(West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
43
25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)-(ii) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
44
25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(3)(A), (7)(A)(ii) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
45
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2710(a), 2713(d) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
46
See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2706(a)(2), 2713(a)(1) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
47
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1166(a), (d) (West, Westlaw Next through 2014 legislation).
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set of rules to govern those disputes. While the experiences of various
tribes throughout the United States in negotiating tribal-state compacts and
conducting post-IGRA gaming are as varied and diverse as Indian country
itself, this paper focuses on the experiences of those tribes based within the
Eleventh Circuit states of Florida and Alabama.48
A.

Florida and Alabama Resist Compacting with Tribes

Shortly after the passage of IGRA, both the Seminole Tribe in Florida
and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians in Alabama sought to negotiate Class
III gaming compacts with their respective states. When neither tribe was
able to successfully consummate an agreement, both filed suit in Federal
Court seeking to enforce IGRA’s mandate that states negotiate with tribes
in good faith over Class III gaming.49 Both states moved to dismiss,
arguing that Congress lacked the authority to abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit through IGRA.50 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama agreed and dismissed
the Poarch Band’s suit;51 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida held that Congress could and did abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity through IGRA, so it denied Florida’s motion to
dismiss the Seminole Tribe’s suit.52
Unsurprisingly, both Seminole Tribe and Poarch Band made their way
to the Eleventh Circuit, which consolidated the appeals.53 The Appellate
Court sided with the states, holding that: (1) they had not consented to the
suit; (2) the Constitution’s Indian commerce clause, pursuant to which
Congress enacted IGRA, does not authorize Congress to abrogate a state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity; and (3) the Ex parte Young doctrine,
which creates a limited exception to sovereign immunity for certain suits
against government officials, was inapplicable to the tribes’ claims.54 The
Seminole Tribe sought and received certiorari from the Supreme Court,
which affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s holdings.55 The upshot of this

48 There are no Indian country lands within the exterior boundaries of the State of Georgia. See
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN RESERVATIONS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, available
at www.nps.gov/nagpra/documents/RESERV.PDF.
49 See Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. State, 784 F. Supp. 1549, 1550 (S.D. Ala. 1992);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. State, 801 F. Supp. 655, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v.
State, 776 F. Supp. 550, 552 (S.D. Ala. 1991).
50 See Poarch Band, 784 F. Supp. at 1550; Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 656; Poarch Band,
776 F. Supp. at 553.
51 Poarch Band, 776 F. Supp. at 563.
52 Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 657-58.
53 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1018 (11th Cir. 1994).
54 Id. at 1022-29.
55 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996). Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s
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litigation was that while tribes had a statutory right to enter into compacts
with states, and states had a statutory obligation to negotiate with compactseeking tribes in good faith, a tribe’s ability to enforce these rights and
obligations in federal court as Congress intended was severely curtailed,
and states could refuse to enter into compacts with relative impunity.56
B.

Early Efforts by the State of Florida to Control Tribal Gaming Without
Agreeing to a Compact

For years after the Supreme Court’s Seminole Tribe decision, the
Seminole Tribe and the State of Florida continued sporadic and largely
unsuccessful discussions regarding a possible Tribal-State gaming
compact.57 At the same time, the Tribe carried on with gaming activities on
its reservation lands. In 1996, despite not having agreed to a compact, the
State of Florida filed suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin alleged
Class III gaming on the Tribe’s reservation on the grounds that such gaming
violated both state and federal law.58 Its complaint named as defendants
both the Tribe itself and, seeking to take advantage of the Ex parte Young
doctrine, the Tribe’s Chairman, James Billie.59 The State contended that the
Tribe was operating Class III slot machines without a compact, in violation
of IGRA, and in violation of state anti-gambling laws that were applicable
in Indian country pursuant to IGRA’s penal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1166.60
The Seminole Tribe and Chairman Billie moved to dismiss, arguing,
inter alia, that they enjoyed sovereign immunity from the State’s claims
and that the state had failed to state a claim because IGRA did not grant it
an implied right of action to enforce the Act against uncompacted, on-

analysis of the Ex parte Young doctrine differed materially from the Eleventh Circuit’s, with the
Supreme Court holding that such a remedy was displaced by the “detailed remedial scheme” that
Congress created, as a part of IGRA, for the enforcement of IGRA’s statutory rights and obligations. See
id. at 73-76.
56 States do not operate with complete impunity because regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of the Interior pursuant to IGRA and in the wake of Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, provide a
framework for the Secretary to issue gaming procedures (“Secretarial procedures”) allowing a tribe to
conduct Class III gaming in appropriate cases after a state has refused to enter into a compact and has
asserted its sovereign immunity to obtain dismissal of a suit brought by the tribe under 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(B). See FTC Class III Gaming Procedures Rule, 25 C.F.R. § 291.3(b), (d) (West, Westlaw
Next through 2014 legislation). But see Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 493, 511 (5th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the Secretarial procedures regulations constitute an invalid exercise of authority and an
unreasonable interpretation of IGRA, and are thus invalid and unenforceable). An in-depth discussion of
the Secretarial procedures regulations is beyond the scope of this article.
57 For a brief overview of the unhappy negotiations process, see Fla. H. of Rep. v. Crist, 999 So.
2d 601, 605-06 (Fla. 2008).
58 See Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1999).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1239-40.
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reservation gaming.61 The district court granted the motion, the State
appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.62 In so doing, the Court
reiterated the settled law that tribes possess sovereign immunity from suit
unless they waive such immunity or it is expressly abrogated by Congress.63
Closely reading IGRA, the Court held that the Act included only a limited
abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity from suits by states; one that
applied “only in the narrow circumstance in which a tribe conducts class III
gaming in violation of an existing tribal-state compact.”64 Because Florida
had not entered into a compact with the Seminole Tribe, it could not avail
itself of IGRA’s limited abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.65 The
Court further held that the Tribe had not waived its sovereign immunity,
and that the Ex parte Young doctrine was inapplicable to a suit against the
Tribe qua Tribe, so the State’s claims against the Tribe were properly
dismissed.66
With regard to the State’s claims against Chairman Billie, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal due to the lack of an implied
right of action under IGRA for a state to sue to enjoin alleged unlawful
Class III gaming being conducted on Indian lands in the absence of a
compact.67 The Court, however, did not close the door completely on the
idea of states suing to enjoin uncompacted Class III gaming in Indian
country. Instead, it noted the possibility that, as alleged in the State’s
amended complaint, IGRA’s penal provision could be read to create an
express right of action for states to sue to enjoin such gaming activity if it
violated existing state laws.68 The Court expressed skepticism of this
reading of § 1166, noting that existing case law “engender[ed] some doubt
about whether it would permit a state to bring an action in federal court”
seeking to enforce state laws against a tribe’s on-reservation gaming
activity, but it declined to rule on the question because the State had
abandoned the argument.69

61 Id. at 1240. The irony of the Seminole Tribe asserting sovereign immunity from the State of
Florida’s IGRA-based claim was not lost on the Court, which opened its opinion by observing that
“[t]his case . . . demonstrates the continuing vitality of the venerable maxim that turnabout is fair play.”
Id. at 1239.
62 Id. at 1239.
63 Id. at 1241.
64 Id. at 1242.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1243-45.
67 Id. at 1245-46, 1250. The Court did not address whether Chairman Billie possessed sovereign
immunity from the State’s suit or whether he would be subject to suit under the Ex parte Young doctrine
because Chairman Billie did not assert a sovereign immunity defense on appeal. See id. at 1245 n.12.
68 See id. at 1246 n.13 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1166).
69 Id. at 1246 n.13.
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The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Seminole Tribe comported with
congressional intent for both tribes and states to have strong motivation to
participate in the compacting process in good faith. There is reason to
question whether the protracted negotiating process that culminated in a
final tribal-state compact in 2010 would have taken place had the Court
eviscerated the Tribe’s negotiating position by effectively allowing the
State to regulate the Tribe’s on-reservation gaming activity without first
agreeing to a compact.70
C.

Ongoing Efforts by the State of Alabama to Limit Tribal Gaming
Without Agreeing to a Compact71

By and large, the Eleventh Circuit’s 1999 Seminole Tribe decision
constituted a resounding rejection of state efforts to control on-reservation
tribal gaming activity in the absence of a tribal-state compact. But by
leaving the door ever so slightly open to the possibility of state suits against
tribes under 18 U.S.C. § 1166, the Court likely made further litigation
inevitable.
In February of 2013, the State of Alabama picked up where Florida left
off, filing suit in its own state court seeking to enjoin the Poarch Band of
Creek Indians from conducting gaming on Indian lands based on a state law
public nuisance theory.72 The Poarch Band promptly removed the case to
federal court, at which point the State filed an amended complaint alleging,
inter alia, that § 1166 made state laws applicable to gaming on Indian
lands.73 Accordingly, the State claimed, § 1166 gave it state and federal
causes of action to enjoin gaming on Indian lands, even in the absence of a

70 The Seminole Tribe and Florida Governor Charlie Crist first came to terms on a compact in
2007, but the State’s House of Representatives brought a successful action challenging the governor’s
authority to enter into the compact without the state legislature’s approval. See Fla. H. of Rep. v. Crist,
999 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 2008). The final compact, bearing the approval of both the Florida legislature
and the Secretary of the Interior, went into effect in 2010. See Notice of Approved Tribal-State Class III
Gaming Compact, 75 Fed. Reg. 38,833 (July 6, 2010).
71 The author should disclose that he is one of the attorneys representing the Poarch Band of
Creek Indians in its ongoing litigation with the State of Alabama. Any opinions expressed herein are the
author’s own, and should not be attributed to the Poarch Band of Creek Indians or any of the other
attorneys representing that Tribe. Id.
72 See Complaint Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., No. 29-CV-900057.00 (Cir. Ct. Elmore Cnty.,
Ala., Feb. 19, 2013). Like the State of Florida when it filed suit against the Seminole Tribe, the State of
Alabama had not entered into a tribal-state compact with the Poarch Band.
73 See First Amended Complaint, State v. PCI Gaming Auth., Civil Action No. 2:13-CV-00178WKW-WC, at 3-4 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 11,
2013),
available
at
http://ftpcontent4.worldnow.com/wsfa/linkedwebdocs/PCIGaming.pdf. The State also alleged, in a
separate line of argument, that the lands on which the Poarch Band of Creek Indians conducts its gaming
activities should not have been taken into trust by the United States for the benefit of the Poarch band,
and therefore should not be considered Indian lands for purposes of IGRA. See id. at 7. This argument
raises additional issues that are beyond the scope of this article.
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tribal-state compact, if that gaming activity would violate Alabama state
law if it took place on state lands.74
The Poarch Band moved to dismiss the State’s amended complaint,
arguing that IGRA leaves no room for the applicability of state laws to
gaming activity on Indian lands and gives states no cause of action or any
other vehicle for enforcing IGRA in the absence of a valid tribal-state
compact.75 On April 10, 2014, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama dismissed the State’s case in its entirety.76 This
case, which remains subject to appeal as of the date of this writing, should
mark the last gasp of state efforts to control tribal gaming on Indian lands in
the absence of a tribal-state compact, at least in the states encompassed
within the Eleventh Circuit. As discussed in detail below, and as reflected
in the district court’s well-reasoned opinion in PCI Gaming, a thorough,
contextual analysis of IGRA unequivocally establishes that, outside the
context of a mutually agreed-upon compact, Congress intended for the
regulation of gaming on Indian lands and the enforcement of IGRA (or
other gaming laws) in Indian country to be left exclusively to gaming tribes
and the federal government.
III. CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND FOR 18 U.S.C. § 1166, OR ANY OTHER
PROVISION OF IGRA, TO AUTHORIZE STATES TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST
INDIAN COUNTRY GAMING WITHOUT ENTERING INTO A TRIBAL-STATE
COMPACT.
Numerous states, including those discussed infra, have tried to enjoin
or otherwise regulate gaming activity in Indian country outside the context
74

See generally id.
See Consolidated Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint,
State v. PCI Gaming Auth., Civil Action No. 2:13-CV-00178-WKW-WC (July 22, 2013); Brief in
Support of Tribal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint, State v. PCI Gaming Auth.,
Civil Action No. 2:13-CV-00178-WKW-WC (M.D. Ala. May 9, 2013). See also United States Amicus
Curiae Brief in Support of Tribal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, State v. PCI Gaming Auth., Civil
Action No. 2:13-CV-00178-WKW-WC (June 5, 2013). Copies of these pleadings may be obtained
through PACER or from the author. The Poarch Band raised additional arguments in its briefing,
including a sovereign immunity defense, that are beyond the scope of this article. However, it is
important to note that tribal sovereign immunity could bar state claims against tribes even if IGRA
created a right of action that would encompass such claims. Accord Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 73-76 (1996); Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1999).
76 See Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., Inc., 2014 WL 1400232 (M.D. Ala. April 10, 2014). The
district court issued its decision during the interval between the submission of this article and its
publication. As of the press date, the State of Alabama’s appeal of the district court’s decision is
pending before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See Alabama v. PCI gaming Auth., Inc., No. 1412004-DD (11th Cir. 2014). See Josh Moon, Judge’s Ruling Favors Creek Casinos, MONTGOMERY
ADVISOR,
Apr.
12,
2014,
available
at
http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/article/20140412/NEWS02/304120030/Judge-s-ruling-favorsCreek-casinos.
75
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of tribal-state compacts since the enactment of IGRA. Such efforts are
inconsistent with the statutory text of and congressional intent for the Act,
and disrespect underlying principles of tribal sovereignty.
When it enacted IGRA, Congress was fully aware of the Supreme
Court’s longstanding recognition of tribal sovereignty and its recent
reaffirmation of tribal authority—and the concomitant lack of state
authority—over gaming on Indian lands in Cabazon. Against this
backdrop, it goes without saying that Congress would have spoken very
clearly where it intended to create new authority for states to control tribal
gaming or otherwise exercise authority over tribal conduct on Indian lands.
Indeed, Congress did speak clearly regarding states’ limited ability to
regulate tribal gaming through the compacting process that IGRA created.77
It also spoke to states’ ability to bring suit in Federal Court to enjoin Class
III gaming activity on Indian lands when such activity violated an existing
tribal-state compact.78 But a close, contextual reading of IGRA’s penal
provision, the Act as a whole, and the Act’s legislative history reveals no
evidence of congressional intent to empower states to enjoin uncompacted
gaming or otherwise enforce gaming laws in Indian country; in fact, the
opposite is true.
A.

An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 1166.

States seeking to establish enforcement authority over uncompacted
tribal gaming on Indian lands often ground their arguments on IGRA’s
penal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1166. Section 1166 provides that “for
purposes of Federal law, all State laws pertaining to the licensing,
regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to criminal
sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same
manner and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State.”79
It then declares that the United States has “exclusive jurisdiction over
criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws that are made
applicable under this section to Indian country”80
Proponents of state enforcement authority over gaming on Indian lands
contend that § 1166 allows states to bring a state law cause of action and/or
creates a private, federal right of action to enjoin uncompacted Class III
gaming activity that would violate state laws if conducted on state lands.
As explained infra, it does neither. Instead, § 1166 creates a body of

77

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2012).
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2012).
79 18 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (2012). By its own express terms, § 1166 excludes from its definition of
“gambling” all types of gaming except for uncompacted, Class III gaming. See id. at § 1166(c).
80
See id. § 1166(d) (2012).
78
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federal law for the United States to enforce if it determines that a tribe is
engaged in unlawful Class III gaming on Indian lands that are beyond the
reach of state enforcement authority.
B.

18 U.S.C. § 1166 Does Not Authorize States to Enforce State Laws in
Indian Country.

Even a cursory review of § 1166 gives lie to the notion that the statute
allows states to enforce their own laws in Indian country or creates any state
law cause of action to enforce IGRA. To the extent that § 1166 renders
state law applicable to tribal gaming at all, it does so only “for purposes of
Federal law.”81 Arguing that § 1166 makes state law qua state law
applicable to gaming on Indian lands impermissibly reads this phrase out of
the statute.
The better understanding of Congress’s incorporation of state
gambling laws “for purposes of Federal law” in IGRA’s penal provision is
that Congress intended to establish and delineate a body of federal criminal
law governing uncompacted Class III gaming on Indian lands.82 Section §
1166, thus understood, perfectly complements the federal civil laws and
enforcement authority set forth elsewhere in IGRA.83 Taken together,
IGRA’s penal and civil provisions give the United States the ability to take
federal civil or criminal action against unlawful Class III gaming on Indian
lands as it deems necessary and appropriate. Neither § 1166 nor any other
provision of IGRA envisions or allows a state law cause of action against
any Indian country gaming activity unless such a cause of action is
provided for in a negotiated tribal-state compact.
C.

The Text and Legislative History of IGRA as a Whole, Including 18
U.S.C. § 1166, Reveal No Congressional Intent to Create any Private,
Federal Right of Action for Enforcement of the Act in the Absence of
a Tribal-State Compact.
The claim that 18 U.S.C. § 1166 gives rise to a private, federal right of
81

18 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (2012).
This comports with the well-settled understanding that IGRA preempts and displaces state
laws with respect to gaming in Indian country. See, e.g., Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d
1237, 1247-48, 1248 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999); Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Fla., 63 F.3d 1030, 1047 n.59 (11th Cir. 1995) (recognizing “the fact that Congress, by enacting IGRA,
has expressly preempted the field in the governance of gaming activities on Indian lands”) (internal
quotation and punctuation omitted); Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 54344 (8th Cir. 1996); United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Oklahoma, 927 F.2d 1170, 1181
(10th Cir. 1991) (“Congress has clearly occupied the regulatory field on Indian gaming.”). Any
proposed reading of § 1166 that would create a purely state law cause of action to regulate gaming on
Indian lands would be wholly inconsistent with this principle.
83
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710, 2713 (2012).
82
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action to enjoin allegedly unlawful, uncompacted gaming on Indian lands
when such an action would be available under state law vis-à-vis gaming on
state lands is also unpersuasive. This argument goes as follows: § 1166
incorporates state gambling laws “including but not limited to criminal
sanctions” for purposes of federal law and makes those laws applicable in
Indian country “in the same manner and to the same extent” that they apply
elsewhere in the relevant state.84 It then grants the United States the
exclusive authority to bring criminal prosecutions for violations of those
incorporated laws.85 Therefore, proponents argue, § 1166 necessarily (but
tacitly) creates an express, private right of action for states to enforce their
civil gaming laws on Indian lands regardless of whether they have entered
into a tribal-state compact.86 This argument runs counter to the text,
purpose, and legislative history of IGRA.
The text of § 1166 itself, even when read in isolation and apart from
the remainder of IGRA, is silent on the matter of civil enforcement. The
statute’s only express grant of enforcement authority is to the federal
government, and then only for criminal prosecutions.87 Section 1166
certainly does not explicitly identify a private, civil right of action for states
to enjoin gaming on Indian lands outside the context of an enforceable
tribal-state compact or to otherwise enforce IGRA.88 Even the fiercest
proponent of such a putative right must concede that it exists, if at all, by
inference. But the remaining provisions of IGRA, as well as the Act’s
legislative history, reflect a careful congressional balancing of power
between states and tribes and provide a compelling argument against
drawing such an inference.
The text and substance of IGRA as a whole demonstrate that Congress
intended to empower and respect tribes, and to provide states with an
extremely limited role in enforcing the Act.89 Congress explicitly grounded

84

18 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (2012).
86 18 U.S.C. § 1166(a), (d) (2012). There is inherent contradiction in the idea of a tacit yet
express right of action. The Eleventh Circuit’s definitive rejection of any implied right of action under
IGRA to enjoin non-compacted gaming forces proponents of a private right of action to enforce state
gaming laws in Indian country to espouse this flawed construct at least within that Circuit. See Seminole
Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1248.
87 See 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (2012).
88 Accord Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1997)
(“Outside the express provisions of a compact, the enforcement of IGRA’s prohibitions on Class III
gaming remains the exclusive province of the federal government.”) (internal citations omitted); United
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Oklahoma, 927 F.2d 1170, 1177 (10th Cir. 1991).
89 It is well-settled that courts, when interpreting statutory provisions, must “look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its policy.” Durr v. Shinseki, 638 F.3d 1342, 1349 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“[I]n construing a statute, we do not look at one word or term in isolation, but instead we look to the
entire statutory context.”) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate to
85
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IGRA on the inherent tribal authority to regulate gaming activity on Indian
lands and the congressional intent to promote, inter alia, “strong tribal
governments.”90 It also declared that the purposes of IGRA included “the
establishment of independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming on
Indian lands [and] the establishment of Federal standards for gaming on
Indian lands.”91 On the other hand, outside of the narrow context of suing
to enforce agreed upon tribal-state compacts,92 Congress did not explicitly
identify any role for states to play in enforcing the Act.
Interpreting one isolated section of IGRA as giving states unchecked
authority to enforce their gaming laws in Indian country would undermine
the declared purposes and obvious aims of the Act. It would weaken tribal
governments by making them subject to state jurisdiction on their own
lands without their consent, and it would allow for the inconsistent
enforcement of non-federal gaming standards in Indian country. It would
also destabilize the compacting process that IGRA plainly encourages;
states with unfettered authority to enact whatever laws they choose, and to
enforce those laws on Indian lands in the absence of a compact, would have
less reason to participate in the compacting process in good faith.93 The
idea of a private, civil right of action for states to enforce their gaming laws
on Indian lands in the absence of a compact is thus wholly inconsistent with
IGRA’s statutory scheme as a whole.
IGRA’s legislative history further supports the idea that Congress did
not intend for states to assume an enforcement role without first agreeing to
a compact. As the Eleventh Circuit has observed, IGRA’s legislative
history shows that Congress “struck a careful balance among federal, state,
and tribal interests.”94 This “careful balance” is reflected, inter alia, in the
compacting process and in the reservation of IGRA enforcement authority
to the federal government in the absence of a compact. The legislative

consider the other provisions of IGRA and the Act’s legislative history when attempting to divine the
congressional intent behind 18 U.S.C. § 1166.
90 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(5), 2702(1) (2012).
91 25 U.S.C. § 2702(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
92 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2012).
93 Indeed, interpreting IGRA as giving states a private right of action to enforce their gaming
laws on Indian lands without entering into a tribal-state compact would disincentivize state participation
in the compacting process. A state’s enforcement authority under a tribal-state compact is necessarily
limited to whatever is mutually agreeable to the compacting parties. If states enjoyed unchecked
authority to enforce their gaming laws without entering into a compact, then doing so could only limit
or, at best, maintain their preexisting authority. It is true that states could have other reasons for seeking
a compact, but a misinterpretation of § 1166 would skew the balance of power and weaken tribes’
negotiation position even in those cases where states are amenable to a compact.
94 Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237, 1247 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing S. Rep. no.
100-446, at 5-6 (1988)). See generally id. at 1247-48 (discussing IGRA’s legislative history and the
manifest congressional intent to limit state authority over gaming in Indian country).
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history further shows that Congress was committed to respecting the rights
and inherent authority of “two equal sovereigns”95 and to the principle that
it would not “unilaterally impose or allow State jurisdiction on Indian lands
for the regulation of Indian gaming activities . . . unless a tribe affirmatively
elects to have State laws and State jurisdiction extend to tribal lands.”96 It
is simply impossible to square these congressional statements with the idea
that § 1166, or any other provision of IGRA, created a private right of
action for states to enforce their own, idiosyncratic civil gaming laws on
Indian lands without tribal consent.
The text and legislative history of IGRA show Congress enacted both:
(1) a federally administered civil and criminal enforcement scheme to
address allegedly unlawful, non-compacted gaming, and (2) a detailed
compacting process that allows states to obtain regulatory and enforcement
authority over gaming on Indian lands only with tribal consent.97
Interpreting § 1166 to allow states to enforce their civil gaming laws on
Indian lands without first entering into a tribal-state compact would
marginalize the compacting process and reject entirely Congress’s carefully
crafted, balanced approach. IGRA, taken in its entirety, compels the
conclusion that states have no right of action to enforce gaming laws in
Indian country outside the context of a tribal-state compact.
D.

The Codification of § 1166 in Title 18 of the United States Code
Further Indicates that Congress Did Not Intend for the Statute to
Create Any Civil Right of Action.

As discussed infra, proponents of a private, civil right of action under
18 U.S.C. § 1166 seek support from the statute’s declaration that the United
States has exclusive jurisdiction to bring criminal prosecutions for
violations of federally incorporated state laws.98 But the codification of §
1166 in the criminal title of the United States Code undermines any effort to
infer a civil right of action; in addition to misconstruing the text of § 1166,
this argument misapprehends the nature of the provision.
The placement of § 1166 in the criminal title of the United States Code
95 S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3083 (quoted in
Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 181 F.3d 1237, 1248 (11th Cir. 1999)).
96 Id. at 5-6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3077.
97 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710, 2713 (1988). IGRA’s civil enforcement scheme is further, important
evidence of congressional intent. While the Act does not evince any intent to allow state enforcement of
the Act, it also does not envision a world in which gaming tribes can flaunt the law with impunity.
Instead, the Act provides a number of ways in which the United States—as the superior sovereign to
both tribes and states—can address unlawful gaming activities on Indian lands, including via criminal
prosecution under applicable federal laws and civil fines and penalties, up to and including facility
closure, levied by the NIGC. See 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (1988); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(6), 2713 (1988).
98 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (1988).
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reflects a conscious choice by Congress. All other provisions of IGRA,
which include extensive civil remedies for violations of the Act, are
codified in Title 25 of the Code.99 As the Supreme Court has explained, a
provision’s placement in the civil code rather than the criminal code is
evidence of “the legislature’s manifest intent” that can be overcome only by
“the clearest proof” of a contrary purpose.100 Accordingly, absent “clearest
proof” that Congress intended for § 1166 to create a civil right of action—
of which there is none—the provision’s placement in the criminal code is
properly understood as evincing a congressional intent for the provision to
be exclusively criminal in nature.101
In light of Congress’s designation and understanding of § 1166 as a
criminal statute, it makes perfect sense that it would refer to authority “over
criminal prosecutions” when expressing its intent for the United States to
have the exclusive authority to enforce the statute. The lack of a reference
to civil enforcement authority constitutes not a tacit yet massive grant of
authority to states, but rather an entirely predictable silence in a provision
that Congress viewed as a federal criminal statute that would work in
tandem with other, civil provisions of IGRA. This certainly is more logical
than engaging in the mental gymnastics necessary to infer congressional
intent to implicitly create a private, civil right of action for states to enforce
a federal penal statute; particularly when such a right of action would fly in
the face of Congress’s expressed intent to respect tribal sovereignty, and to
limit states’ control over gaming on Indian lands absent tribal agreement.
E.

Applicable Principles of Statutory Interpretation Support the
Conclusion that There is No Private Right of Action to Enforce IGRA
or State Gaming Laws in Indian Country.

As discussed infra, IGRA as a whole and § 1166 in particular cannot
fairly be read as creating a private right of action for states to enforce
99

See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (citations omitted) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Avila-Santoyo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 713 F.3d 1357, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 2013).
Additional evidence of congressional intent and understanding is drawn from Congress’s labeling of the
provisions in the bill that became IGRA. Section 23, which includes the provision now codified as §
1166, was labeled “Criminal Sanctions,” while Section 14, which sets forth the NIGC’s civil
enforcement powers, was labeled “Civil Sanctions.” See IGRA, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467,
2482, 2487 (1988). When Congress applies such labels to provisions of a bill, the labels constitute
“quite clear” evidence of legislative intent regarding the nature of those provisions. United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980); see also Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 703 F.3d 930, 943 (6th Cir.
2012).
101 The statute’s incorporation into federal law of state laws “including but not limited to criminal
sanctions” does not constitute clear proof of a congressional intent for § 1166 to create a civil right of
action. That language is better understood as incorporating into federal law a state’s prescribed criminal
penalties in addition to its other substantive criminal laws, such as the definitions of offenses.
100
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gaming laws on Indian lands outside the context of a tribal-state compact.
To the extent that the text and statutory history of IGRA leave any room for
doubt, however, such doubts are easily resolved by applying the widely
recognized Indian canons of statutory construction.
When interpreting statutes pertaining to Indians, it is well-settled that
“[] traditional notions of Indian sovereignty provide a crucial backdrop
against which any assertion of State authority must be assessed.”102 In this
case, the backdrop of tribal sovereignty is particularly relevant, as IGRA
was enacted in the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court’s holding
that gaming on Indian lands constitutes a valid exercise of tribal sovereignty
over which states have no inherent authority.103 While Congress had the
power to change the status quo by authorizing private civil actions against
Indian tribes, it provided no “clear indication[] of legislative intent” to do
so.104 Accordingly, the backdrop of tribal sovereignty should give
considerable pause to any court that is asked to infer a tacit right of action
for states to enforce gaming laws on Indian lands outside the scope of a
tribal-state compact.
The backdrop of tribal sovereignty is not the only tool of statutory
interpretation that compels a pro-tribe reading of § 1166. Another
universally recognized and uniquely applicable canon of construction
mandates that any ambiguity in statutes enacted for the benefit of Indians be
resolved in favor of Indians.105 IGRA is such a statute.106 Accordingly,
even if § 1166 were vague, and subject to multiple fair interpretations, any
ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Act’s intended Indian
beneficiaries, and against the existence of a private right of action for states
to enforce gaming laws on Indian lands.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proper role of states in regulating gaming activity on Indian lands

102 New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
103 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216-22 (1987); see also
infra, Part I.B.
104 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978). In fact, as discussed infra, the Act’s
statutory text as a whole, its legislative history, and the codification of § 1166 within the criminal code
overwhelmingly indicate Congress’s intent not to allow such actions.
105 See, e.g., Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 730 (9th Cir. 2003)
(applying the Indian canons of construction to IGRA); United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v.
Oklahoma, 927 F.2d 1170, 1179 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897
F.2d 358, 366-67 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing legislative history indicating that this Indian canon of statutory
construction should apply in any IGRA-related litigation).
106 See e.g., Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino, 353 F.3d at 730; United Keetoowah Band of
Cherokee Indians, 927 F.2d at 1179; Sisseton Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, 897 F.2d at 366-67.
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has been a source of struggle and controversy since the very first days of
modern tribal gaming. Through IGRA, Congress intended to put that
controversy to rest, or at least to create a framework through which states
and tribes, as equal sovereigns, could respectfully resolve it. Congress most
certainly did not intend, as some states in effect have argued, for IGRA to
undercut tribal authority by subjecting sovereign tribal lands to state laws
and state enforcement jurisdiction without tribal consent.
At best, any argument supporting a supposed private right of action for
states to enforce their gaming laws in Indian country without tribal consent
relies on inferences that are inconsistent with the text, structure, and
legislative intent of IGRA. Such inferences also would be at odds with a
sizeable body of federal case law and the rules of statutory construction
mandating that IGRA be construed in the light most favorable to Indian
tribes and against the backdrop of inherent tribal sovereignty. More plainly
stated, such arguments rely on inferences that are unsupportable. States that
wish to enforce their laws with respect to gaming activity on Indian lands
may do so with tribal consent and agreement or not at all.

